By Elene Davitashvili
International Relations and Affairs Student at Free University of Tbilisi
December 2025 • 7-Minute Read

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, is the largest military aggression against a sovereign state in Europe since World War II and one of the most serious and far-reaching challenges to modern international relations. The conflict has not only affected the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, but has also exacerbated the confrontation between Western countries and Russia, especially in the context of energy security, as it is perceived by states as a geopolitical lever and economic resource. For two decades, Putin has deliberately increased Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, which has become one of the main elements of hybrid warfare.

After the end of the Cold War, relations between the West and Russia changed from cooperation to confrontation. Since the late 1990s, the Kremlin’s geopolitical ambitions have been evident. Russia inherited the vast natural resources and energy infrastructure of Siberia from the Soviet era, which allowed it to assume the role of supplier to the entire European continent and thus exert political influence. (Durakovic, 2023) Western Europe has gradually become more dependent on Russian gas – especially Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. The construction of Nord Stream also served this purpose. If before that, Europe perceived energy dependence as an economic cooperation, (Birol, 2022) since 2022 this attitude has changed and has become a direct threat in terms of security. Therefore, I want to delve into the significant ways that Russia has been using it as a tool to pressure Europe. (Negotiations, 2022)

Russia’s Energy Pressure Mechanisms

In July 2022, Reuters reported that Nord Stream 1 significantly reduced natural gas supplies, (Reuters, 2022) citing maintenance delays. Natural gas is the primary source of electricity for industry in Europe. The reduction in supplies also led to higher prices. Russia gradually increased its pressure: in addition to Germany and Italy, it also cut off natural gas supplies to France, Poland, Finland, and the Netherlands. (Energy, 2024) Although the UK was not directly heavily dependent on Russian gas, this process also affected it indirectly, as it is economically closely integrated into the European space. This was a sign from Russia that if the EU and the UK continued the sanctions policy imposed as a result of the war, they would suffer. Accordingly, energy security does not only include an economic dimension, it is part of geopolitical and strategic security. (Versolmann, 2025) However, Russia’s pressure mechanisms are not based solely on European dependence. At the same time, the Russia-China alliance is strengthening through close military, economic and energy cooperation. Due to Western sanctions, the direction of Russia’s oil and natural gas exports has shifted from West to East. In this context, the Kremlin is trying to strengthen economic ties with the BRICS member states, reduce dependence on the Western financial system and create an alternative economic model with its allies, which aims to end the hegemony of the US dollar.

The European Union’s Challenges and the Path to Energy Independence

In the first months of the war, the EU countries sharply felt their dependence on Russian natural gas. The reduction in supply led to a sharp increase in prices and an energy supply crisis. As I have already mentioned, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands were more dependent, and this was reflected in their domestic politics, anti-Russian political sentiment and financial situation. In such a situation, in my opinion, the more cooperation and a strategic approach are needed between the member states, the more difficult it is to reach a consensus and form a common opinion based on domestic private interests. The Slovakia-Hungary factor is interesting, which shows how difficult it is for some countries to obtain alternative energy sources in the short term, especially in conditions of geographical limitations and less opportunity to diversify imports. Let us recall that in November 2025, US President Donald Trump granted Hungary a one-year sanctions exemption for the purchase of Russian oil and gas.  (Spokesperson, 2025) Despite this, the EU has managed to make reducing its dependence on Russia a strategic priority, which included increasing investment in renewable energy, finding alternative sources of natural gas (e.g. the US, Qatar, Norway) and introducing energy efficiency standards. In May 2022, the European Commission presented the €300 billion REPowerEU plan, (Simson, 2022) which aimed to eliminate imports of Russian energy by 2027. According to the plan, 45% of energy should come from renewable sources by 2030, mandatory solar panels should be introduced in buildings, and energy efficiency should increase to 13%. It also signed a new long-term agreement with the US in 2023 on the supply of LNG, which made the EU the largest energy buyer of the US. (EU, 2025)

It is worth noting the large-scale packages of sanctions imposed on the government and oligarchs, with which Europe is still trying to isolate Russia in the international arena. In October 2025, the 19th package of sanctions was adopted, which included a suspension of imports of liquefied natural gas and a ban on transactions with major energy companies (Rosneft, Gazprom Neft). (Rachel Holman, 2024) It is noteworthy that the Baltic states and Poland immediately supported strict sanctions and a refusal to buy Russian energy, although due to economic and geographical factors this was a problem for Hungary and Slovakia, while dependence on the Nord Stream project affected the social situation, political stability and economic growth of Germany. Despite the divergent interests among member states, the European Union has made significant progress towards energy independence, as evidenced by the REPowerEU plan and the development of alternative markets, which underscores the importance of joint strategic action.

In conclusion, Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine on February 24, 2022, triggered major geopolitical shifts, isolating Russia and leaving it without important allies. At the same time, it revealed the importance of energy dependence in global politics, especially for European countries that have been dependent on Russian gas and oil for years. In response, the EU’s strategy has evolved into a complex combination of sanctions, energy diversification, and the reduction of Russian influence. As a result, the war in Ukraine and Russia’s manipulations have once again confirmed that energy security is a central element of modern geopolitics.

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